How does a predecessor theory relate to its successor? According to Heinz Post's General Correspondence Principle, the successor theory has to account for the empirical success of its predecessor. After a critical discussion of this principle, I outline and discuss various kinds of correspondence relations that hold between successive scientific theories. I then look in some detail at a case study from contemporary physics: the various proposals for a theory of high-temperature superconductivity.
Introduction
Philosophers of science provide us with idealized accounts of science. Sadly, however, these accounts often do not work, as the endless series of discussions among philosophers shows. These discussions typically follow a common scheme: In step 1, a philosopher It should be noted, however, that Post's analysis does not take the 'loser's perspective' into account. From this perspective there are indeed successes of the old theory which the new theory cannot account for.
7 Besides, even from the 'winner's perspective' the thesis of zero Kuhn losses may be too strong. Saunders (1993: 296) , for example, writes that "Laudan [(1981) ] is right to insist that one can always find some theorem, deduction, conjecture, or explanation that has no precise correlate in the successor theory". He then goes on, though, to distinguish between significant and insignificant Kuhn losses; only the insignificant ones are, of course, 'allowed'. I will come back to this issue below. Radder (1991) has pointed out another problem for Post's approach: Not all equations of L may 'degenerate' in equations of S. As an example, consider the famous formula E = m 0 c 2 for the energy of a particle with rest mass m 0 . This equation makes sense only in the special theory of relativity. It remains unaltered in the limit of low velocities v (i.e. for β := v/c → 0), although it does not correspond to an equation of classical mechanics.
According to Post, the General Correspondence Principle is both a descriptive and a normative thesis. It is considered to be a post hoc elimination criterion and theories which do not fulfill it should be, as Post boldly advises, consigned to the 'wastepaper basket' (Post 1971: 235) . Examining cases from the history of science, Post only spotted one 'counterexample' to the General Correspondence Principle. Ironically it is the best theory we have today: quantum mechanics, a theory that, or so Post argues, does not account for the successes of its predecessor classical mechanics (Post 1971: 233) . This is a crucial failure which Post blames on the supposed incompleteness of quantum mechanics (Post 1971: 234, 246) . 8 Quantum mechanics therefore does not, for Post, count as a case against the General Correspondence Principle. Instead the fact that quantum mechanics does not fulfil the General Correspondence Principle shows that this theory should not be accepted or at least that it should not be considered to be the successor of classical mechanics. It belongs, perhaps, in the wastepaper basket. Other proponents of a generalized correspondence principle, such as Radder, do not go as far and emphasize correspondence relations that do hold between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics.
Their arguments will be examined in the next section.
Before doing so, another issue needs to be mentioned. So far, the following three theses are in conflict: (1) Post's General Correspondence Principle is descriptively correct, (2) the belief in the truth of quantum mechanics is justified and (3) quantum mechanics and classical mechanics share a common set of phenomena. Rather than rejecting theses
(1) or (2) one might doubt thesis (3). Cartwright (1999) , for example, argues that we 7 Cf. Hoyningen-Huene (1993: 260-262) and the references to the work of Kuhn cited therein. 8 It is interesting to speculate how Post would evaluate the recent work on decoherence and the alleged "emergence of a classical world in quantum theory". See Joos et al. (2003) .
have good reasons to believe that there are two disjunct classes of phenomena; some can be modeled by using the toolbox of quantum mechanics, others by relying on classical mechanics. There is consequently no quantum mechanical model of classical phenomena.
Contrary to Cartwright, however, Post and -I believe -most physicists hold the view that quantum mechanics and classical mechanics do share a common set of phenomena.
They assume that quantum mechanics accounts for the phenomena of classical mechanics in principle; it is merely a matter of computational complexity to demonstrate this. In the end, however, this might be nothing but a metaphysical dream.
What is the outcome of the discussion so far? First of all, when the General Correspondence Principle is applied, it often does not hold strictly, as Radder's example shows.
Besides, there are losses from the loser's perspective and maybe also losses from the winner's perspective. Secondly, as a consequence of all this, there is a tension between the practice of actual science and a normative reading of the General Correspondence Principle. And yet Post is right when he points out that there is a lot of continuity in scientific theorizing, even across scientific revolutions. Still, the relations between various theories in the history of science are much more complicated than the General Correspondence Principle makes us believe. Perhaps there is no single and non-trivial principle which captures the rich structure and variety of developing scientific theories. This can only be established empirically. What is needed, therefore, is a careful examination of episodes from contemporary science and the history of science on which, perhaps, a meta-induction can be based. As a first step, it is helpful to highlight various relations which hold between successive scientific theories. This is what we will do in the next section.
A Plurality of Correspondence Relations
In the development of scientific theories, continuities as well as discontinuities appear.
Hence, the interesting question to be addressed is this: Which elements of S and L correspond to each other, and which elements do not? Are there general rules that guide practising scientists in those difficult decision situations (if it can be reconstructed as such)? As a prolegomenon to such a task, it is reasonable to examine more closely how specific scientific theories relate to each other. Which elements are taken over, what are the motives for doing so and how are the elements of the old theory made to fit the new theory? Examining cases from various sciences, I will address these questions and provide a preliminary (and not necessarily exhaustive) list of correspondence relations which may hold between successive theories. Some theories exhibit more than one of these relations, and some correspondences appear at different stages of the development of a theory.
A first useful distinction is between ontological and epistemological correspondence rela- (Cushing 1993: 262) , because the Bohm theory "did not enable one to retrieve the classical and well-confirmed account of a ball rebounding elastically between two walls" (Fine 1993: 280 outside its domain, some consequence of the latter is incorporated into T as an antecedent condition, which then places strong constraints on the selection of laws that have explanatory relevance in the modified theory T " (Kamminga 1993: 77) .
This procedure, therefore, provides a link between the two theories. Note, however, that this way of connecting two theories is only a very loose one. It has some heuristic value but it should be noted that the assumptions taken over from the predecessor theory remain unexplained in the successor theory. In many cases, Law Correspondence is only a post hoc selection criterion of theory choice. As Radder's above-mentioned example demonstrates, it may only hold for some of the laws of the theories in question.
Model Correspondence. This type of a correspondence relation comes in two variants. (1) A model which belongs to S survives theory change and re-occurs in L.
A typical example is the harmonic oscillator which is widely used in classical mechanics, but is also applied in quantum mechanics and in quantum field theory. It should be noted that models, such as the harmonic oscillator, are not only taken over by the theory which succeeds the original theory, but also by quite unrelated theories. This is best seen by pointing to all other theories of physics which employ the harmonic oscillator; in fact, it is difficult to find a theory which does not employ It is a case of borrowing a model of the S-theory which contained features not essential for the modelling of the S-theory ('neutral analogy'), and assigning physical significance to such extra features" (Post 1971: 241 ). An example is the crystallographic models which were used already a century before physicists identified the units of the regular lattices with physical atoms. Sometimes, Post concludes, scientists built "better than they knew" (Post 1971: 242) . This example also shows that Model Correspondence of this second kind may indeed lead to an explanation of the success of the predecessor theory. 9 However, the criterion is highly fallible, Structure Correspondence does not imply Numerical Correspondence. Often, the 9 For more on the relation between models and theories see Frigg and Hartmann (2006) . 10 Note that for Saunders, 'relativism' is a collective name for social constructivism, historicist epistemology, linguistic holism and anti-realism; cf. Saunders (1993: 295 f). 11 Cf. Saunders' discussion of ether in Saunders (1993: 299) .
structure is 'too far away' from the empirical basis of a theory in order to guarantee continuity at that level (especially in the cases Saunders has in mind). It is therefore not at all trivial to reproduce the empirical success of the precursor theory once one has decided to take over parts of the structure of the old theory. Second, there are continuities and discontinuities in scientific theorizing, although it is not a priori clear which elements of a theory will survive theory change, and which ones will have to go. An additional difficulty for correspondence theorists is the notorious problem of underdetermination. Maybe there is no unique best choice regarding which elements of successive theories should correspond and which should not correspond with each other.
Third, the philosophical project of a methodology is best described by the picture of a toolbox. According to this view, methodologists extract -ideally on the basis of a wealth of case studies -a set of methods and techniques which can tentatively be applied by practicing scientists in a particular situation. What is in the toolbox may, however, depend on time. Good scientists know, of course, already a wealth of tricks and methods, and they also know how to use them flexibly and appropriately. This view of the status of methodology is a middle ground between two extreme positions. Zahar (1983: 258 f) defends a rather strong form of a rational heuristics which leaves little room to chance and other influences, while Popper's (1972: ch. 7) evolutionary picture supports the opposite view, that there is no rational heuristics and it is the job of the scientists to make bold conjectures which then have to 'survive' empirical tests and rational criticism (cf. Radder 1991: 201 f). My conclusion seems, after all, to be similar to Post's view on the role of heuristics which he illustrates with an apt analogy: "The study of the structure of existing houses may help us in constructing new houses" (Post 1971: 217) .
4 Modelling High-Temperature Superconductivity:
A Case Study
In this section, I will look at a case study from contemporary physics and ask which role heuristic principles such as the General Correspondence Principle play in science. The case study deals with a scientific episode that is ongoing. So far, there is no consensus in the scientific community, only a multitude of more or less elaborated competing research programs and strategies. I'll identify some of these strategies and ask which role correspondence considerations play when scientists are confronted with an intricate problem.
The case study deals with our theoretical understanding of high-temperature superconductivity. Conventional superconductivity is a phenomenon long well known and understood. It occurs at extremely low temperatures close to the absolute zero. For a long time, it was considered to be impossible to find or produce substances that remain This complicates the theoretical understanding of these so-called cuprates considerably and so it is no surprise that, despite a lot of theoretical work over the last twenty years and a wealth of experimental data, no theoretical understanding of high-temperature superconductivity is forthcoming.
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There is, however, a well-confirmed theory of conventional superconductors. This theory, the so-called BCS theory -named after its inventors James Bardeen, Leon Cooper and Robert Schrieffer -, is a microscopic theory that explains the appearance of a su- (1996) and Waldram (1996) for (somewhat dated) overviews. More recent reviews are Anderson (2006) and Kivelson (2006) .
by a large distance, they act effectively as a single particle which has the quantum statistical properties of a boson. And this is why a large number of Cooper pairs can be in the lowest energy state, which in turns leads to the vanishing of the electrical resistance in the materials. Complementing the BCS theory, Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieffer proposed a specific model -the BCS model -that specifies the concrete mechanism that is responsible for the creation of Cooper pairs. This mechanism is based on so-called s-wave interactions of the electrons, mediated by the vibrating crystal lattice, and accounts for all phenomena involving superconductivity discovered until 1986.
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When it comes to understanding high-temperature superconductivity, two points are uncontroversial: (i) The BCS theory also applies, i.e. high-temperature superconductivity results from the formation of electron pairs at temperatures below the (materialdependent) critical temperature.
(ii) The BCS model does not apply. More specifically, it is generally accepted that s-wave interactions cannot account for the extremely high transition temperature that we find in the cuprates. And so the task is to develop a new model. To do so, physicists follow a wide variety of approaches that can be located on a spectrum ranging from conservative to highly revolutionary apoproaches.
Conservative approaches aim at developing an account that deviates as little as possible from the theoretical framework of the BCS theory (i.e. the Fermi liquid theory) and the more specific assumptions of the BCS model. Revolutionary approaches attempt to formulate an account of high-temperature superconductivity in a new theoretical framework and propose mechanisms that deviate considerably from the BCS model. While some authors suggest different mechanisms for different types of materials, others want to identify the mechanism of high-temperature superconductivity. Besides these extreme approaches, a whole range of approaches in between has been put forward.
All of these approaches are developing, constantly modified and occasionally completely rejected, but none has yet succeeded. Even twenty years after the astonishing discovery of Bednorz and Müller, there is no satisfactory and generally accepted theory of hightemperature superconductivity. Given that we had to wait 46 years from the discovery of conventional superconductivity (by Heike Kamerlingh Onnes in 1911) to the formulation of the BCS theory (in 1956), we might have to be patient for quite a while. That it is taking so long is seen as an indication that a major theoretical breakthrough can be expected. In situations like this, much is at stake and the debate among the members of the relevant scientific community often touches philosophical and methodological issues.
So let us have a look at some of the proposals that are currently discussed:
1. The conservative strategy and underdoped materials, the state of matter out of which the superconductivity arises exhibits a so-called pseudogap at temperatures which are high compared to the transition temperature (Norman et al. 2005) . The pseudogap was found only three years after Bednorz and Müller's original discovery, but its physical origin, its behavior and whether it constitutes a distinct phase of matter is still not well understood. What is clear, however, is that the pseudogap will play an important role in any theory of high temperature superconductivity. Lee (2006) , for example, believes that the existence of the pseudogap supports the Charge Density Wave (CDW) theory as the large pseudogap in the cuprates can be generated by a CDW order with d-symmetry.
The revolutionary strategy
Philip Anderson started off defending a truely revolutionary strategy. He submited that the problem of understanding high-temperature superconductivity cannot be attacked by a minimal modification of the BCS model. He hence proposed to give up a standard assumption in solid state physics -that the system can be described as a
Fermi liquid -and to replace it with the assumption that the systems in question are, in the normal as well as in the superconducting state, so-called Luttinger liquids.
Anderson's account was highly speculative and was rejected by most physicists. And so the question remains how conservative or revolutionary a future theory of hightemperature superconductivity should be. As there is no consensus in the scientific community over which strategy is the right one, a final assessment of the various strategies is not possible at the moment. While a majority of physicists seem to be in favour of a conservative account, Anderson's (1995: 38) reply is still worth taking seriously: "[I]f it is time for a revolution, enjoy it and relax!"
Correspondence at Bay? -Some Lessons
What are the implications of our case study for the General Correspondence Principle?
First, it has to be noted that the starting point for the development of theories of hightemperature supercondictivity was not an internal anomaly of the predecessor theory,
i.e. the BCS theory (and the BCS model) of conventional superconducters. Quite to the contrary, the account given by BCS turned out to be an excellent tool to learn about the physics (and chemistry) of superconductors for many years. No one doubted, for example, that it is a perfectly consistent theory. And yet after a while, new experimental data were produced that could not be fit into the BCS account.
the current developments.
Second, none of the proposals for a theory of high-temperature superconductivity that have been for put forward so far contain the BCS account as a limiting case. There is, hence, no new theory that accounts for the successes of the old theory as well as for the class of new phenomena. And so the General Correspondence Principle seems to be violated. Or isn't it? A way out for the correspondence theorist is to argue that the General Correspondence Principle cannot be applied to the case of high-temperature superconductivity. She could argue that the corresponding materials belong to a completely different class of materials, that the phenomena in question (i.e. conventional and high-temperature superconductivity) are too different, and that the similarity between them is at best superficial. And so we are not supposed to apply the General Correspondence Principle (or something like it). What is at stake is the question of what the domain of applicability of methodological principles such as General Correspondence
Principle is and how we find or identify this domain. I have no principled answer to this question (and doubt that there is one). At best, I think, we can trust the judgement of the scientific community, which is the only authority I can see. For now, the scientific community has not made up its mind on high-temperature superconductivity, and the field is characterized by a large amount of dissent over questions ranging from specific scientific questions to methodological questions.
Looking more closely at the various proposals for a theory of high-temperature superconductivity, one realizes that all of them take over some elements of the BCS account. All of them, for example, adopt the idea that pairing is responsible for superconductivity.
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And some of them modify the BCS pairing mechanism only slightly, so that the mechanism responsible for high-temperature superconductivity can be understood as a natural extension of the mechanism for conventional superconductivity. I conclude from this that there is certainly some continuity on the theoretical level. But continuity is not an allor-nothing matter (as the General Correspondence Principle makes us think). How far the continuity reaches (or should reach) will depend on the specific case in question and is a matter of debate. In the course of science, different (and sometimes even the same) scientists will try out different approaches and adopt different general methodological or scientific principles. The best way to understand this, as already argued at the end of section 3, is to consider methodological principles as tools that are tentatively adopted by some scientists for a specific purpose. Whether they are good tools or bad tools depends on the specific case and will be decided, in the end, by the scientific community.
16 The BCS account is the BCS theory plus the BCS model. 17 For a recent discussion, see Tsai and Kivelson (2006) .
The General Correspondence Principle is just one tool among many that scientists tentatively use in the process of theory (or model) construction. In many cases, there will be a lot of dissent over the question of how closely the successor theory should be related to its predecessor. The respective considerations are typically subtle and deeply entangled with the problem at hand. I submit that general methodological principles unfold their fruitful action only when adapted to a specific problem.
This raises a difficulty for those philosophers of science who are interested in the identification of general methodological principles. Instead of doing this, it might be best to restrict oneself and help put together a toolbox of principles that scientists can tentatively use on an as-needed basis. To do this seems to me to be an important task. It is both doable -unlike the program of rational heuristics -and worthwhile. Philosophers of science are especially qualified to undertake such a project, as they overlook a greater part of science than do practitioners, who are often confined between the boundaries of their field of specialization.
Rationality, Realism and Coherence
Even if the continuity that we observe in scientific theorizing does not fit into the neat picture that goes with the Generalized Correspondence Principle, there is no doubt that there is a lot of continuity (or stability, as Hacking puts it) in scientific theorizing. So the following questions arise: Why is it that there is so much continuity in science? And how can this continuity be understood philosophically? Note that these are questions that cannot be attacked locally, i.e. on the basis of case studies alone.
In "The Social Construction of What?", Hacking (1999) presents two explanations for the prevelent continuity in scientific theorizing. The first explanation, realism, stresses factors internal to science and comes in various variants. One of them is convergent realism, which holds that successive theories of 'mature science' approximate the truth (i.e. the ultimate or final theory) better and better. This presupposes the existence of a measure of the distance of a given theory from the truth (or at least an ordering relation), which is a controverial topic despite all the worthwhile work on verisimilitude and truthlikeness 18 , and conflicts with the many discontinuities that emerged in the development of 'mature' scientific theories, as Laudan (1981) has convincingly demonstrated. Another problem of convergent realism is that there might be no ultimate theory. It is possible that the process of constructing ever better theories never ends because "there are infinitely many levels of structure that can be unpacked, like an infinitely descending sequence of Chinese 18 See Niiniluoto (1999) for a recent exposition.
as well. Clearly, discontinuities do not fit in the scheme of convergent realism. But also weaker forms of realism do not explain the relative weights of continuities and discontinuities in scientific theorizing. And constructionism fails to do so as well. However, it is the (possibly case-dependent) relative weights that cry out for an explanation and so I conclude that an alternative explanation is needed that helps us understand why there is as much continuities and as much discontinuities in scientific theorizing as there
is. Such an explanation should fulfill the following three conditions. (i) It should be sufficiently general, as our goal is a philosophical understanding of the scientific practice.
(ii) It should be descriptively correct and account for successful scientific practice. (iii)
It should combine internal and external factors, as both seem to be important.
Providing an explanation of the relative weights of continuities and discontinuities in scientific theorizing that fulfills these three conditions is a difficult task and an easy answer such as 'realism' or 'constructionism' is unlikely to succeed. Instead I suggest to adopt a formal philosophical framework and construct philosophical models within this framework, mimicking the successful scientific methodology of constructing models of a theory mentioned in the Introduction. The philosophical framework will be general and satisfies condition (i). The models will provide details to account for more specific cases, which helps satisfying condition (ii). Constructing more specific models makes sense as the relative weights will depend on the specific scientific theories in question.
The framework we chose will make sure that internal and external factors are taken into account, thus satisfying condition (iii). Let us now see how this works.
The central idea of my own explanation, coherentism, is that the transfer of elements of the predecessor theory S (whose well-confirmed part S * is non-empty) into the successor theory L increases the overall coherence of our knowledge system. The word "coherence" is here used in the epistemological sense, i.e. as a measure for how well a body of beliefs "hangs together". As Lawrence BonJour explains, " [it] is reasonably clear that this 'hanging together' depends on the various sorts of inferential, evidential, and explanatory relations which obtain among the various members of a system of belief, and especially on the more holistic and systematic of these." (BonJour 1985: 93) Given this account of coherence, it is plausible that S (or better: S * ) and L cohere more if, ceteris paribus, the two theories share common elements.
Before working out my coherentist account, a potential objection has to be addressed.
One may ask why both S (or S * ) and L should be in our knowledge system at the same time. Why isn't S simply abandoned and replaced by a theory L which is itself more coherent than the conjunction of S * and L? Although some theories in the history of science were indeed abandoned altogether and no elements were transfered from S to give the same result anyway). There is, however, also an epistemic reason why classical mechanics is still so popular. The theory provides explanations that quantum mechanics is unable to provide. This is, again for practical reasons, because classical mechanics can account for phenomena quantum mechanics cannot account for. However, we also favor the Newtonian explanation of, say, the tides over an explanation based on Einstein's general theory of relativity as the concepts classical mechanics employs (such as force)
are "closer" to the phenomenon in question which arguably helps us to understand. An explanation of the tides based on the properties of curved spacetime would only obscure the situation. Good explanations function like this, and as it is one of the goals of the scientific enterprise to provide explanations of the phenomena in its domain, (the well confirmed part of) classical mechanics is indispensable and remains an integral part of our knowledge system.
Let us now develop our tentative account of scientific theory change. To do so, we need (i) a precise account of the notion of coherence and how it is measured. To measure the coherence of a scientific theory (or of a set of scientific theories), we also need (ii) a representation of a scientific theory that suits this request. As we will see, choosing a Bayesian framework will satisfy both requests.
We explicate (the empirical part of) a scientific theory T as a set of interrelated models
Here a model is represented by a proposition M i which may itself be a conjunction of more elementary propositions (such as instantiations of laws, additonal model assumptions and initial and boundary conditions). Each model M i is related to a phenomenon, represented by a proposition E i (for "evidence"), that it accounts for.
We define a probability distribution P over all model variables M i and all phenomena variables E i . This probability distribution is best represented by a Bayesian Network.
In such a network, there is an arrow from each model node M i to its corresponding phenomenon node E i , and there are various arrows between the model nodes which reflects the idea that the models in a scientific theory mutually support each other. By doing so, BonJour's "various sorts of inferential, evidential, and explanatory relations which obtain among the various members of a system of belief" can be modeled probabilistically. For example, if model M 2 entails model M 1 , then P (M 1 |M 2 ) = 1, and if model M 2 supports model M 1 , then P (M 1 |M 2 ) > P (M 1 ) (for details, see Hartmann (2007)).
In the next step, these probabilistic dependencies between models have to be aggregated to arrive at a coherence measure coh(T ) of the theory T . While there are several different proposals in the literature for how to do this, my preferred one is laid out in my book
Bayesian Epistemology (with Luc Bovens). In this book, we show that no such coherence measure exists and that all that can be done is the specification of a function that generates a partial ordering over a set T = {T 1 , . . . , T n } of theories. Sometimes there is no fact of the matter, which of two theories is more coherent. But often there is.
At this point, the natural question arises why coherence is a good thing. Even if scientists do aim for a highly coherent knowledge system (which explains the use of correspondence considerations), it is not clear why science should aim for a highly coherent knowledge
system. So what is at stake is the normative question. Simply put, the answer is that, given certain conditions, coherence is truth-conducive. 21 In the Bayesian framweork, this means that the more coherent set of, say, models, is also the one that has the greater posterior probability (provided that certain ceteris paribus conditions are satisfied). This is an important result as it makes informal discussions of the coherence theory of justification more precise (Bovens and Hartmann (2003a, b) ).
Similarly, the following can be proven: If the new theory L adds one additional model to its predecessor S * and if L is more coherent than S * , then L has a higher posterior probability than S * if the prior probability of L is not much lower than the prior probability of S * . For details and a proof, see Hartmann (in preparation). Note that there is clearly a correspondence relation between S * and L as all successes (as well as the failures) of the old theory are taken over in the new, more encompassing theory.
What I have presented are the initial steps of a philosophical research program. Clearly much more needs to be said and more philosophical models have to be studied to better evaluate the prospects of a full-fledged Bayesian account of scientific theory change. For example, a Bayesian account of the various correspondence relations discussed in sec. 3 has to be given. If all goes well, we have a methodology at hand that will help us to explain (using the notion of coherence) and justify (using the truth-conduciveness of coherence) the successful scientific practice. But we have to be cautious and not expect too much.
As Earman (1992: ch. 8 ) points out, scientific theory change presents a whole range of other problems for the Bayesian. So I do not pretend that all aspects of scientific theory change can be accounted for in Bayesian term. However, until the contrary is proven, I follow Salmon (1990) and take Bayesianism to be an attractive philosophical research 21 I here follow the standard usuage of the term. Note, however, that "truth-conducive" is a misnomer as Bayesians only specify subjective probabilities, and a posterior probability of 1 does not entail the truth of the proposition in question. I thank Kevin Kelly for pointing this out to me.
program that helps us to illuminate the intricacies of scientific theory change.
Before closing, a word is in order about the nature of the probabilities in our Bayesian framework. Bayesians typically assume that individual agents have subjective degrees of belief which I take to include internal as well as external factors. These degrees of belief may differ from scientist to scientist as different scientists may have different background knowledge and different "scientific tastes". And yet, we observe that different scientists often assess new hypotheses similarly and reach similar conclusions about their acceptability. There is much to Kuhn's idea that the scientific community is the real decision-making agent, and it is an interesting research project to construct models for the aggregation of individual probability functions to a probability function of the scientific community. I have to leave this task for another occasion.
